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ABSTRACT 
According to John Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance model (1953, 1955) rational observers behind a veil of 
ignorance seek to maximize the sum of individual utilities. However, Harsanyi’s model is based on the 
erroneous assumption that the observers’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function allows comparing 
welfare interpersonally. This paper suggests a modification of Harsanyi’s model that allows comparing 
welfare interpersonally, by using life years in perfect utility or happy life years as a measure of welfare. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Selon le voile d’ignorance proposé par John Harsanyi (1953, 1955), l’observateur rationnel derrière le 
voile d’ignorance cherche à maximiser la somme des utilités individuelles. Cependant, le modèle 
d’Harsanyi est fondé sur une hypothèse erronée que la fonction d’utilité à la von Neumann-Morgenstern 
de l’observateur permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être. Ce papier suggère une modification 
du modèle d’Harsanyi qui permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être, en utilisant les années de 
vie en parfaite utilité ou les années de vie heureuse comme mesure du bien-être.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
John Harsanyi published in 1953 and extended in 1955 a theory of morality which in essence 
says that a rational society seeks to maximize the sum of individual utilities. According to 
standard terminology it is a preference, average-utility, act-utilitarian theory. Also called the 
Equiprobability Model, it not only considers egoistic preferences, but also moral value 
judgments about the utility distribution in society. These moral judgments are made by an 
impartial and rational observer behind a veil of ignorance. The observer has an equal 
probability of being any member of society. Each member of society possesses von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over lotteries. The observer has preferences over 
the positions in society which are also represented by a vNM utility function. These 
preferences are called extended preferences (Broome 1998). As John Weymark (1991) 
correctly points out, there is absolutely no information permitting an interpersonal 
comparison of extended preferences, however. The observer measures strength of 
preferences under uncertainty, by assigning numbers to the expected utility of lottery tickets. 
These utility numbers are then compared on a cardinal probability scale, but only with the 
possibility to rank them (Baumol 1958). The vNM utility function is not able to compare the 
utility of lottery tickets across individuals because each individual has a different “marginal 
subjective utility of an increase in the probability of winning [a prize in the lottery]” 
(Baumol 1958). Hence, the vNM utility function only allows an ordinal ranking of 
preferences. Additional criticism on Harsanyi’s model was provided by James Griffin (1986, 
p. 112-3), who argued that it remains unclear how the observer should bridge the preferences 
of individuals: Harsanyi’s observer is supposed to have no personal preferences, yet he must 
be able to perform intrapersonal comparisons by portraying extended preferences on his 
personal scale. 
EXTENDING EXTENDED PREFERENCES 
 
Recently, Juan Moreno-Ternero and John Roemer (2006) have suggested an extension of 
Harsanyi’s model which allows the observer to make welfare interpersonally comparable 
without a personal scale. In detail, the observer first steps in the shoes of any person i and 
takes on i’s risk preferences and vNM utility function. Then, the observer imagines how i 
would feel in terms of welfare if he (i) were to be realized as any person j with a given 
wealth level. Next, the observer converts j’s wealth to the welfare-equivalent wealth for i. By 
taking on every person’s viewpoint the observer has an n number of wealth distributions 
where n is the total number of individuals. The observer may then take the average of these 
wealth distributions to assess the utility of an action. 
The principle idea is thus to convert utility into wealth as wealth can be compared across 
individuals. A further advancement compared to Harsanyi’s model is that the observer does 
not need to have a personal scale to portray i’s preferences as he can use wealth as a 
representation of preferences. Still, this approach is limited by the assumption that utility 
only depends on wealth. However, utility also depends on health, longevity, and other 
factors. Thus i does not only need to consider j’s wealth when determining a welfare 
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equivalent, but also j’s health and other factors influencing j’s welfare. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to state a welfare-equivalent wealth in each situation. For example, when i is 
severely handicapped, there is no amount of wealth that could provide i with the same level 
of welfare as j.  
Instead of using wealth as a measure of welfare, I suggest using life years in perfect utility or 
happy life years (HLYs). This metric was originally developed to measure and compare 
quality of life in nations (Veenhoven 1996). When applying this metric in this model, person 
i assesses the number of HLYs that is equivalent to person j’s lifetime utility profile. Thus, 
utility is still measured in terms of preferences, as desired by Harsanyi’s model. Lifetime 
utility depends on the utility state (Q) and the number of life years (T). All utility states are 
assumed to be preferred to death. The lifetime utility profile is referred to as Q{n}, where 
Q{n} is a vector of the utility state in each year (Qi), ie, Q{n} = {Q1,…,QT}. HLYs are 
defined as the number of life years such that: 
 
U(Q{n}) = U(Q*, HLYs) 
 
where U denotes utility and Q* denotes a perfect utility state1. 
Obviously, HLYs have the desired property of being measurable on a cardinal scale. 
Furthermore, they can be compared without requiring the observer to have a personal 
preference scale. In fact, the only assumption HLYs require is that preferences are 
monotonic with respect to HLYs. One may object, though, that one HLY may mean 
something different to each individual, ie, may not comparable across individuals: an 
individual who has low expectations may require less health and consumption to achieve 
perfect utility than an individual with high expectations. Note, however, that individuals 
reveal their level of expectation by the number of life years: when assessing person j’s 
utility, a low expectation translates into a high number of HLYs and vice versa. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Preference utilitarianism (including the Equiprobability Model) seems to be today’s most 
common variant of utilitarianism. It is supposed to avoid problems of classical utilitarianism 
which relate to defining utility as well as an absolute unit of measure for utility in order to 
allow interpersonal comparisons. However, the second alleged advantage has been 
questioned by several authors (Weymark 1991, Hausman 1995). This paper addresses this 
criticism by suggesting, based on the contributions of Harsanyi (1953, 1955) as well as 
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006), a novel model to comparing welfare interpersonally. 
The proposed approach uses life years in perfect utility or happy life years as a measure of 
welfare. 
                                                 
1
 See Johannesson (1995) for a similar description with regard to healthy-years equivalents. 
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